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Abstract
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, for West Germany, France, Italy and US,
we econometrically select within a SVAR model some ﬁscal policy regimes, i.e. a
”set of rules” for the implementation of ﬁscal policies. Second, we identify the
ﬁscal policy shocks related to diﬀerent categories of expenditure and taxation, and
simulate their eﬀects on economic activity. Empirical evidence shows that in the
selected European countries ﬁscal decisions mainly target government expenditure
while a clear-cut distinction between spending and taxation regimes is not found
in the US. Both shocks on government spending and taxation generate keynesian
responses of output, although ﬁscal multipliers are quite low (output reacts by 0.1
percent quarterly on average at most to a 1 percentage change in the expenditure
or revenue ratio). In Italy, the US and France, the strongest eﬀect on output is
produced by shocks on government expenditure on wages and transfers.
Keywords: SVAR, Fiscal Policy.
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Non-technical summary
The paper empirically analyses the eﬀects of diﬀerent ﬁscal shocks on economic
activity in the last four decades. The introduction of ﬁscal rules at European
level and the empirical ﬁndings of non-keynesian eﬀects of some ﬁscal consolida-
tion episodes have recently revived the interest in the study of ﬁscal policy decisions
and of the elements that determine their economic impact. The literature on non-
keynesian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy has emphasised the relevance of the composition
of the adjustments. Cross-country studies revealed that ﬁscal consolidations im-
plemented via spending cuts – in particular in public wages and transfers - are on
average more eﬀective in producing positive macroeconomic eﬀects than consolida-
tions implemented via tax increases. However, the issue of non-keynesian eﬀects is
not uncontroversial as it is argued that these eﬀects often occur under speciﬁc cir-
cumstances of initial public ﬁnances and under speciﬁc macroeconomic conditions.
This paper further investigates the role of diﬀerent kinds of expenditure and rev-
enue shocks in aﬀecting economic activity in four OECD countries (West Germany,
France, Italy and US). It adopts an approach which diﬀers from that of cross-country
studies as ﬁscal policy innovations are identiﬁed and their eﬀects on economic activ-
ity are simulated within a structural vector autoregression model that describes the
decision process of the ﬁscal policy-maker. Diﬀerent possible ways of conducting
ﬁscal policy are in the paper deﬁned as ‘ﬁscal policy regimes’: each regime tar-
gets a diﬀerent budgetary category, allowing the other ﬁscal variables to adapt to
a change in the targeted variable. The budget balance is disaggregated in govern-
ment spending in wages and transfers, residual spending and taxation. An empirical
test is proposed to discriminate amongst ﬁscal regimes targeting at these variables.
Empirical evidence suggests that, while in the selected European countries ﬁscal
regimes target government expenditure, a clear-cut distinction between spending
and taxation regimes is not found in the US. The simulation analysis shows that
ﬁscal shocks, both on revenues and expenditure, produce the standard keynesian
results on output: on average, a decrease in public expenditure lowers output and
a decrease in taxation leads to an expansion. In contrast with some cross-country
evidence, shocks which increase government spending on wages and transfers have in
most cases the strongest positive eﬀect on output. However, supporting the existing
empirical literature, the size of multipliers in no cases is large or long lasting.1 Introduction
The setting of new institutional frameworks at European level for ﬁscal policy mak-
ing and the empirical evidence of non standard (non-keynesian) eﬀects of some
ﬁscal consolidation episodes have revived the interest in the study of ﬁscal policy.
In Europe, the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, by imposing
budgetary limits, represent the most important reference for the implementation of
policy actions since the 1990s. Similarly, in the last decade ﬁscal policy decisions in
the US have been led by the budgetary rules imposed after the increasing budget
deﬁcits in the 1980s.1
In this context some questions can be raised: how do ﬁscal consolidations aﬀect
economic activity? Is ﬁscal policy relevant for business cycle ﬂuctuations? Moreover,
the imposition of quantitative limits on budget deﬁcits raise the question: when
keeping deﬁcits within bounds, do governments prefer to tighten public expenditure
or to increase taxes? In the past, were ﬁscal policy decisions more “expenditure-led”
or “taxation-led”?
In this paper we deal with such issues from an empirical perspective. Our main
objective is twofold. First, we empirically select the “ﬁscal policy regimes”, namely
the rules according to which ﬁscal policy actions were decided (whether taxation
decisions preceded expenditure decisions or vice-versa). Second, for the selected
ﬁscal policy regimes, we identify ﬁscal policy shocks and estimate both their eﬀects
on output and their relevance for business cycle ﬂuctuations.
In our analysis we disaggregate the budget balance in expenditure and taxation
and focus on a speciﬁc type of expenditure: government wages and transfers. This
allows to test a particular policy regime where the authorities target this kind of
government spending and let taxation and other expenditure decisions follow.
The recent literature on non-keynesian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy has highlighted the
importance of targeting expenditure on wages and transfers. In cross-country stud-
ies Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) showed that a relevant element in determining
non-keynesian eﬀects is the type of adjustment: namely, whether the ﬁscal consol-
idation is implemented by cutting public expenditure rather than increasing taxes.
Moreover, they argued that the macroeconomic eﬀects of the cuts in public expen-
diture diﬀer, depending on whether they aﬀect public wages and transfers rather
than other types of expenditure.
The role of such expenditure is studied within a framework which is diﬀerent from
that of the literature on non-keynesian eﬀects. Instead of focusing on case studies
or single consolidation episodes, we analyse long time series making use of vector
autoregressions models. This kind of analysis can be considered as complementary
to the other to the extent to which it still allows to focus on the role of diﬀerent
ﬁscal innovations, but it is carried out over a whole sample period rather than over
few consolidation episodes.
The work is inspired by the recent empirical literature on monetary policy, which
uses Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) models here conveniently adapted to
1The two laws approved by the Congress (the Budget Enforcement Act in 1990 and the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation in 1993), aiming at putting the high budget spending under control, resulted
in several years of consecutive budgetary surpluses.
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chard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2002) for the US and other OECD countries.
Our work, however, takes this approach one step further by proposing an empirical
test which allows to discriminate between policy regimes, and by considering a more
detailed disaggregation of budgetary items.3
Our ﬁndings show a diﬀerence in the implementation of policy actions between
the European countries in our sample (West Germany, France and Italy) and the US.
Data suggest that, while in the European countries ﬁscal regimes target government
expenditure, a clear-cut distinction between expenditure and taxation regimes is not
found for the US. This is in line with previous ﬁndings for the US. The simulation
analysis shows that both kind of ﬁscal shocks produce keynesian results: on average,
a decrease in public expenditure decreases output and a decrease in taxation leads
to an expansion. In contrast with some cross-country evidence, positive shocks
in government spending on wages and transfers have in most cases the strongest
supportive eﬀect on output. However, in line with existing literature, the size of
multipliers in no cases is large or long-lasting.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some stylised facts on
ﬁscal variables relevant for our analysis in the sample period considered. Section 3
reviews the most recent empirical literature on ﬁscal policy, while Section 4 provides
an explanation of the concepts of “shock” and “regime” that are widely used in
this paper. The core of the paper is Section 5, which presents the empirical model.
Estimation and simulation results are reported in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
2 Stylised Facts
The role of ﬁscal policy has been changing over the last decades in all the industrial-
ized countries. In the 1960s ﬁscal policy played an important role as a stabilisation
tool. However, the rapid increase of public deﬁcits and debts during the 1980s made
clear the need to bring public ﬁnances back towards a sustainable path. Oﬃcial
constraints on both deﬁcit/GDP and debt/GDP ratios were imposed in Europe ﬁrst
with the Maastricht Treaty and afterwards with the Stability and Growth Pact.
Similarly, in the US, following a period of increasing budget deﬁcits in the 1980s,
the government imposed some budgetary rules, which eﬀectively contributed to re-
duce ﬁscal imbalances in the 1990s and led to protracted surpluses in the recent
past.
This paper focuses its empirical analysis on the composition of ﬁscal adjust-
ments analysing in particular the role of diﬀerent components of total government
expenditure in determining ﬁscal policy making. Total government expenditure has
been disaggregated in government expenditure on wages and transfers and residual
spending.4
2The SVAR methodology has been only recently applied to ﬁscal policy (see Section 3), whereas
it is widely used for monetary policy. One of the main reasons is the unavailability of reliable ﬁscal
data at high frequency for long periods of time and for many countries. Like Favero (2002) and
Marcellino (2002), for the empirical application of this paper we use the OECD database in order
to have homogeneous data across countries.
3A similar approach to test monetary regimes has been adopted by Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
4The residual expenditure is a relevant budgetary item, as it includes interest payments on
ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 7In all the countries considered, government spending on wages and transfers
represents a sizeable share of total spending. The highest percentage in the sample
period of our analysis is recorded in Italy, with an average of 70 per cent over the
period. In West Germany5 and France this share is around 66 per cent, whereas in
the United States the percentage lowers to 59 per cent.
A picture of the increasing weight on economic activity of such expenditure for
all countries over time is given by Fig. 1. The ﬁgure shows that public wages and
transfers as a percentage of GDP have been rising since the 1960s in all the countries.
While in Europe this share increased from about 23-24 per cent of GDP in the 1960s
up to 30-35 percent in the 1990s, in the US it increased gradually and slightly over
time from 15-16 per cent of GDP to over 20 per cent in the same period.
Fig. 2 shows that the increase in spending was accompanied by an upward trend
in the revenue-to-GDP ratio. In all countries the revenue ratio has been rising
monotonically in the last four decades, although with diﬀerent intensity. In Europe
the largest increases was in West Germany during the 1970s and in France and Italy
during the 1980s, with the share of revenues on GDP being well above 40 per cent
in all countries. In the US the increase over the period was more gradual and the
revenue ratio has never been higher than 30 per cent.
The observed co-movement of revenues and expenditure raises some questions:
does such an increase in government expenditure on wages and transfers correspond
to a ﬁscal regime where decisions on those expenses preceded every other decision?
Did the increase in expenditure lead to an increase in taxation, or did the decisions
on taxes precede the decisions on spending?
3 Related Empirical Literature
While there is a broad consensus in the literature on the eﬀects of monetary policy
on economic activity, there is more uncertainty about the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy
decisions. According to the standard keynesian models, cuts in public expenditure
or increases in taxes dampen aggregate demand directly and indirectly via a de-
crease in disposable income and private consumption. Neo-classical models justify
smaller multipliers within the standard keynesian theory by allowing a more com-
plex interaction of aggregate demand with real and money markets. Recently, new
theoretical approaches have even supported the idea that ﬁscal consolidations may
have positive eﬀects on economic activity by acting through the conﬁdence channel
when they credibly interrupt upward trends in public debt. Empirical evidence does
not provide a unique answer to this issue by showing that non-keynesian eﬀects may
take place under well deﬁned circumstances.
The empirical investigation of the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks on out-
put has mainly developed around two lines of research which make use of two dif-
ferent methodological tools.
The ﬁrst one, known as the “ex-post approach”, analyses single consolidation
episodes. By comparing the macroeconomic performance and the ﬁscal situation
the public debt, which have been (and still are for some highly-indebted European countries) a
considerable percentage of total government spending.
5The data for West Germany cover the period up to the uniﬁcation.
















































































































































































































































































































ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 10before, during and after an episode of ﬁscal consolidation, the ex-post study allows a
comprehensive analysis of the eﬀects of a ﬁscal retrenchment on the level of economic
activity. Many contributions identiﬁed some consolidation episodes which lead to
an economic expansion. Among the elements resulting to play an important role in
the determination of a macroeconomic success there is the qualitative composition of
the ﬁscal adjustment.6 McDermott and Wescott (1996), Alesina and Perotti (1997)
and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) ﬁnd that a consolidation implemented through a
cut in public spending - and in wages and transfers, in particular - is more eﬀective
in producing positive macroeconomic eﬀects, on average, than one operated by an
increase in taxation. The justiﬁcation for this goes through the credibility channel:
a cut in public wages and transfers, by resulting more unpopular, would signal a
stronger willingness to revert a deteriorated ﬁscal position.
The second line of research is based on the estimation of the response of economic
variables to ﬁscal shocks by considering long time spans of data rather than case
studies. This approach makes use of the Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology.
The most recent literature allows ﬁscal shocks to be estimated through the identiﬁ-
cation of a Structural VAR model (SVAR), which avoids the problem of arbitrarily
choosing an indicator for the ﬁscal stance.
So far, the SVAR methodology has been largely and successfully applied in the
empirical monetary policy literature (see, for instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans, 1998), but it has been only used for ﬁscal policy exercises in a few recent
works. The ﬁrst contributions using VAR for ﬁscal policy analysis are those by
Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) and Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999, 2000). In these papers ﬁscal exogenous shocks are
selected according to the so-called “narrative approach”, which consists of identify-
ing the most relevant ﬁscal episodes through the reading and the interpretation of
historical documents.
A recent development of the methodology avoids the problem of subjectively
selecting ﬁscal exogenous shocks. Fiscal shocks are rather estimated after a struc-
tural VAR (SVAR) is identiﬁed, namely after some restrictions are imposed on the
contemporaneous relationships among the variables included in the VAR.
The most relevant contribution in this literature has been provided by Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002) for the US economy. The authors make use of institutional
information on the tax and transfer systems of this country to identify structural
ﬁscal shocks and to estimate their impact on macroeconomic variables. The basic
idea of the identiﬁcation scheme is that a quarter (the periodicity used to estimate
the model) is too short a period for output economic variables to aﬀect ﬁscal policy
variables. The policy-maker requires time to collect information about the state of
the economy, to think about ﬁscal policy reactions and ﬁnally to implement them.
The model is composed of three variables: government expenditure, tax revenues
6Other studies identiﬁed diﬀerent factors. In their preliminary works, Giavazzi and Pagano
(1990, 1996) highlight the importance of the size of ﬁscal adjustments in positively aﬀecting the
likelihood of a success. A sizeable consolidation eﬀort, rather than one of small magnitude, seems
to lead more likely to an expansion of the economy. Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) and Von
Hagen, Hughes Hallett and Strauch (2002) stress also that the initial economic conditions in which
a consolidation episode starts are relevant for its success, while Zaghini (2001) emphasises the
persistence of the adjustment.
ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 11and the level of output. While tax revenue can be contemporaneously aﬀected by
output, there is no feedback from economic activity to public spending. The simul-
taneous reaction of taxes, however, would only catch automatic eﬀects and not the
discretionary reactions of the policy-maker. The economic activity (measured by
real GDP) is supposed to be contemporaneously aﬀected by unexpected changes in
both ﬁscal variables. The inclusion of taxation and spending in the model allows
the authors to consider two possible ways in which the budget items can aﬀect each
other: taxation decisions come ﬁrst and spending follows, and taxation innovations
follow exogenous spending decisions.7 The two ﬁscal models are estimated sepa-
rately. As they are exactly identiﬁed, no formal testing is applicable to discriminate
among them. However, data do not allow to select one of the two models as the
coeﬃcients of the reaction of spending to taxation and of taxation on spending are
not statistically signiﬁcant.
The simulation of the model shows a standard keynesian reaction of the economy
to both kinds of shocks: an increase in taxation has negative eﬀects on output and
consumption, while a positive innovation in public expenditure produces positive
eﬀects on these variables.8
In another application, Perotti (2002) enlarges the model to include additional
macroeconomic variables (the price level and the nominal interest rate) and extends
the application to other countries.9 The evidence conﬁrms the previous ﬁndings
but, consistently with the prediction of more developed keynesian models, it shows
the weakness of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policies on the economy, especially in the last
20 years. This results in very low spending and tax multipliers, which the author
justiﬁes with the increased openness of the economies, the switch from a ﬁxed to
ﬂexible exchange rate regime and the possible change of monetary policy regimes.
The empirical application we propose is inspired by the model of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) as we adopt a similar identiﬁcation scheme and use the same
econometric tool to investigate the economic eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks. However, our
approach diﬀers from theirs to the extent to which we estimate an overidentiﬁed
model - rather than an exactly identiﬁed one - to test whether taxation decisions
precede or follow spending decisions.
Our contribution may be also linked to the ﬁrst line of research since we study the
quantitative and qualitative role of shocks in government expenditure on wages and
transfers. The “ex-post approach” has highlighted the relevance of this variable in
determining an economic success. Here, we estimate its weight in the determination
of the other ﬁscal variables and evaluate the eﬀect of innovations in such expenditure
on output by using long (and homogenous) time periods rather than episodes or case
studies.
7The issue of the intertemporal relation between government spending and revenues was ﬁrst
raised by Von Furstenberg et al. (1986). They found support for the sequence allowing taxes to
respond to expenditure innovations rather than for the reverse sequence.
8A variant of this model, which includes other macroeconomic variables, have been proposed
by Fatas and Mihov (2000), when a preliminary version of the Blanchard and Perotti’s paper was
published. The identiﬁcation scheme is basically the same, and the model produces keynesian
responses.
9Countries selected are US, West Germany, UK, Canada and Australia, for which are available
reliable and detailed quarterly ﬁscal data from national sources.
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Terms like “shock” and “regime”, commonly used in the empirical monetary policy
literature (see, for instance, Walsh, 1998, or Christiano, et al., 1998), are in this
paper applied to ﬁscal policy.
Like in monetary policy, ﬁscal policy actions may be well anticipated by economic
agents or may show up quite unexpectedly. The expected component of ﬁscal policy
represents all the ﬁscal decisions and the changes in ﬁscal variables that the market
is able to anticipate given the currently available information set. Changes in public
expenditure and revenues owing to the operation of automatic stabilizers are good
examples. On the contrary, innovations in ﬁscal policy variables that the market is
not able to predict are the unexpected components of ﬁscal policy. According to the
rational expectation theory, these policy surprises have the most relevant impact on
endogenous variables. The unexpected component of ﬁscal policy is more commonly
known in the literature as the ﬁscal policy shock.
Within the SVAR framework, the identiﬁcation of the shock goes through the
selection of the ﬁscal policy variables to include in the model and the setting of the
relationships among these. As in this application we distinguish between government
expenditure on wages and transfers, residual spending and revenues, we identify
three ﬁscal policy shocks corresponding respectively to the three budgetary items.10
The distinction of these three ﬁscal variables gives the chance to empirically
analyse the relationships among them. In particular, we want to ﬁnd out whether
there is an order in the occurrence of such ﬁscal shocks: do shocks in taxation precede
innovations in public expenditure? Or, alternatively, are changes in public wages
and transfers preceded by taxation and residual spending decisions? Such shock
orderings are deﬁned as diﬀerent ﬁscal policy regimes. They design alternative ways
of implementing ﬁscal policy.11
With respect to the existing literature on the design of ﬁscal regimes, our original
contribution is the focus on government expenditure on wages and transfers and the
possibility to empirically test among regimes. The explicit role of innovations in
government wages and transfers is relevant for policy considerations: establishing
whether innovations in such variable preceded tax changes – probably with the scope
of ﬁnancing the expenditure increase – is useful to assess the care of the policy-maker
for the sustainability of public ﬁnances.
A great deal of the empirical literature on monetary policy has dealt with the
selection of an operative target for monetary policy, whether this can be the short-
10According to the structural VAR technique used in this paper, the number of innovations have
to be equal to the number of variables in the VAR. For a discussion on the limitation of the number
of driving shocks, see the appendix in Blanchard and Quah (1989); see also Lippi and Reichlin
(1993) and the recent proposal of dynamic factor models by Stock and Watson (2002) and Forni,
et al. (2000).
11The ordering of the shocks (expenditure shocks preceding taxation shocks, or vice-versa) is
simply a time ordering and cannot be interpreted as a formal causality ordering. However, there
is a relationship with Granger causality. To the extent to which expenditure shocks precede tax-
ation shocks, we can conclude that expenditure shocks formally Granger-cause taxation. Granger
causality concerns the ability of some variables (or shocks) to help forecasting others, but cannot
be interpreted with the broader meaning of economic causality.
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(Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992, Eichenbaum, 1992, Strongin, 1995, Bernanke
and Mihov, 1997 and 1998). The market for bank reserves, where central banks
intervene, is commonly used as a reference to design the diﬀerent monetary regimes.
The modelling approach for ﬁscal policy exercises presents slight diﬀerences in
this respect. The absence of an operative target in ﬁscal policy (like the short-term
interest rate or bank reserves for monetary policy) makes the concept of ﬁscal policy
regime diﬀerent from that of monetary regime. A ﬁscal regime is interpreted in this
literature as an ordering and/or a combination of ﬁscal policy shocks which, however,
is still able to illustrate the way in which the policy-maker implements ﬁscal policy.
5 A Model of Fiscal Policy Regimes
The present application is based on Structural VAR econometrics and is inspired
by the recent literature on monetary policy.12 Following this literature, we propose
a distinction of the variables included in the model between policy and non-policy
variables. This distinction is based on the ability of the authorities to directly aﬀect
the policy variables. As it is standard practice in the monetary policy literature, the
policy variables usually include short-term interest rates and bank reserves, while
the second group includes the ﬁnal objectives of the monetary authorities actions,
such as output and/or price level. Since monetary policy authorities are generally
quick to react to “news” on non-policy variables, it is commonly assumed that
policy variables react to innovations in the non-policy variables within the same
unit of time (say one month, if using monthly data); however, it takes more than
one sample period to observe any reaction in the non-policy variables to a change
in the policy variables.
We propose a similar distinction between ﬁscal policy variables and macroeco-
nomic aggregates, although we assume diﬀerent relationships among them.13 We
identify two groups of variables: the ﬁscal policy (FP) variables and the non-ﬁscal
policy (NFP) variables. The former are supposed to be under the direct control of
the policy-maker, whereas the latter interfere with ﬁscal policy decisions but are not
able to react to ﬁscal policy shocks within the same unit of time. A particular status
is assigned to the level of output of the economy, which is not included among the
NFP variables. On the one hand, unlike the monetary policy exercises, we assume
that output reacts contemporaneously (i.e. within the same unit of time) to the
ﬁscal policy variables because some of these (e.g. public expenditure on ﬁnal goods)
are part of the aggregate demand. On the other hand, because of the lags that char-
acterize ﬁscal policy, innovations in output are likely to take more than one period
to aﬀect ﬁscal policy decisions. Indeed, once ﬁscal measures to stabilise the economy
have been detected, it takes more than a quarter before these measures are passed
by Parliament with appropriate laws.14 Therefore, the real output is considered the
most endogenous variable in the model.
12See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) for a detailed survey.
13This modellization is similar to that of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
14This argumentation does not necessarily hold for revenues. Revenues can be contemporane-
ously aﬀected by output through the change of tax basis. Further discussion is provided in section
5.2 describing ﬁscal variables.
ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 14In the next three sections we present the econometric model we estimate, the
ﬁscal variables included in the model and the identiﬁcation restrictions imposed in
the structural VAR.
5.1 VAR Structure: Identiﬁcation and Estimation
The estimation of a structural VAR involves two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the unre-
stricted VAR generates a vector of reduced-form residuals that cannot be econom-
ically interpreted. The second stage establishes a set of links between the reduced-
form innovations and the (economically meaningful) structural innovations, which
are mutually uncorrelated. The links between the reduced-form and the structural
innovations represent an explicit way to model the contemporaneous correlations of
the reduced-form residuals. These links are shaped according to plausible restric-
tions among the economic variables of the original VAR.
Let us group all the economic variables of the VAR into the vector xt, which is in
turn disaggregated in three subvectors: xNFP,t, which contains the NFP variables,
xFP,t with the FP variables and, ﬁnally, the level of output, yt.15
The NFP subvector contains (from the top to the bottom) the price level and
the short-term interest rate. Changes in these variables may determine changes in
the ﬁscal variables.16 In particular, because of progressive taxation systems in all
countries, the price level can aﬀect nominal tax revenues. Moreover, changes in the
interest rate may have a direct eﬀect on residual government expenditure - which
includes interest payments - especially in countries with a high public debt. We
assume that prices are sticky in the short-run and react to changes in the other
variables with at least one period (i.e. one quarter) lag. The role of interest rate
can be justiﬁed either as a monetary instrument, assuming that monetary policy
decisions are taken independently from ﬁscal policy decisions, or, more generally, as
a (weakly) exogenous variable for the ﬁscal policy regimes.
The FP vector contains three ﬁscal aggregates: government expenditure for
wages and transfers, other government expenditure and current revenues. In the
ﬁrst stage, the estimation of the unrestricted VAR (given by (1)) generates three
subvectors of innovations, one for NFP variables (uNFP,t), one for FP variables
















In the notation above, R(L) is a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator L
and R(0) = I.
15Bold lower-case (capital) letters indicate vectors (matrices).
16Some empirical studies include inﬂation rather than the price level. We decided to consider
the latter for both econometric and economic reasons. First, as the price level is a I(1) variable,
we prefer to include this along with all the other I(1) variables in the model, rather than a I(0)
variable, like inﬂation. Second, the reaction function of the monetary authorities in the empirical
monetary policy literature is usually based on the interest rate, the price level and the output
level. We think it is important to maintain the same structure for the identiﬁcation of the possible
ﬁscal-policy reaction function.
ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 15In the second stage, for the estimation of the orthogonalised, economically mean-
ingful (structural) innovations, a recursive causal block-order is assumed from the
set of NFP variables to the set of both the FP variables and then to output. More-
over, a recursive causal order is also established for the NFP variables belonging to
xNFP,t.17 In terms of the relationship between the fundamental innovations (uNFP,t,
uFP,t and uy,t) and the structural innovations (vNFP,t, vFP,t and vy,t, which are all





























The shape of the matrices that link the NFP shocks to the FP shocks are all
known according to the deﬁnition of NFP variables given above.18 In addition, we
assume that the output reacts to all fundamental innovations, which implies that
a3,1 and a3,2 are full vectors, with no zero restrictions.
The core of our identiﬁcation are the matrices A2,2 and B2,2, which shape the
relationships among the ﬁscal innovations and the ﬁscal shocks:
A2,2uFP,t = B2,2vFP,t. (3)
The idea behind our identiﬁcation scheme is that of proposing diﬀerent shapes
for A2,2 and B2,2 (or parameter constraints), namely diﬀerent sets of (weakly) causal
links among the ﬁscal variables which identify the policy line of the ﬁscal authorities
and that we therefore deﬁne as “ﬁscal policy regimes”. We assume that ﬁscal shocks
are correctly identiﬁed once a ﬁscal regime has been selected by data.
The imposition of constraints on A2,2 and B2,2 is necessary to identify model (2)
from the estimates of the parameters of the unrestricted VAR (1). When more than
the necessary constraints to identify exactly the model are imposed, a test for overi-
dentifying restrictions can be applied to check whether the additional constraints
are accepted by the data.19
17According to the deﬁnitions of our vectors, this means that the price level aﬀects contempo-
raneously the short-term interest rate, but not vice-versa. Hence, the interest rate equation may
be interpreted as a monetary policy rule that focuses on inﬂation.
18More in details, A1,1 is lower triangular, B1,1 is diagonal and A2,1 is a full matrix.
19In this exercise, the non-stationarity of the data is not emphasised and the cointegration
analysis is not undertaken. A ﬁrst justiﬁcation is that the data may be quasi-nonstationary; in
fact, the presence of unit roots in the time series cannot be tested with high power.
The neglecting of cointegration constraints is further motivated by the following considerations.
The analysis is generally focused on short-run constraints and the short-run dynamic response
of the system. When cointegration constraints are excluded, this only implies that the long-run
responses of some variables are not constrained and might follow a divergent path. However, the
short-run analysis is still valid. Moreover, Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) proved that standard
asymptotic inference is not aﬀected even when the variables included in the VAR in levels are
cointegrated. Finally, although FIML estimates are no longer eﬃcient if cointegration constraints
are not included, they still remain consistent. The lower eﬃciency in the estimates can be justiﬁed
by the diﬃculty in the economic interpretation of some of the cointegration constraints showed by
the data (for some countries we found four cointegrating vectors).
ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 165.2 The Fiscal Policy Variables
Before proceeding with the identiﬁcation of the ﬁscal regimes, it is important to
better qualify the ﬁscal policy variables (FP) that we use in our analysis. This helps
justifying the zero constraints imposed in the system (2).
The zero constraints of the coeﬃcient of output in the two equations of expen-
diture and on that on revenues mean that the FP variables do not react contempo-
raneously to output. Concerning expenditure equations, this is justiﬁed by the lag
related to the implementation of ﬁscal policy decisions. As already mentioned, this
lag is due to the time needed to approve new laws.20
However, the same argument is more diﬃcult to support for revenues. Indeed,
output changes have an immediate eﬀect on the tax bases which may translate
into automatic variations in revenues. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) compute the
elasticity of revenues to output and impose the estimated value in their equation for
tax revenues. Here we follow a diﬀerent approach and assume that that coeﬃcient
can take value zero or one. Revenues is the only variable to enter the model as a
share of GDP. In this case, a coeﬃcient equal to one would imply that a change
in output immediately aﬀects tax bases, but takes more than one quarter to aﬀect
revenues. The zero assumption, instead, describes the opposite situation: tax bases
and revenues react immediately and one-to-one in the same quarter to a change in
output.
Among the two assumptions, we consider more plausible and use in the rest of
the analysis the one according to which revenues react within the same quarter to
output changes (the zero assumption): structural innovations on the revenue side
are therefore recovered from innovations on the revenue ratio (henceforth deﬁned
as ﬁscal pressure).21 The case in which the coeﬃcient equals one is examined only
when responses to tax shocks are analysed.
The next subsection describes the constraints we impose on system (3) for the
identiﬁcation of the ﬁscal policy regimes.
5.3 Identifying Fiscal Policy Regimes
Focusing only on the relationships among ﬁscal shocks given by system (3), lets de-
ﬁne the reduced form innovations on government expenditure for wages and transfers
with gw, those on residual government expenditure with gr and those on current rev-
enues with τ. We assume that there are no direct links among the reduced-form
innovations of each FP variable. Therefore the reduced form innovations depend on
the structural innovations of each FP variable.
The links among the FP innovations can be rewritten in the following way:22
20Blanchard and Perotti (2002) impose the same constraint by setting b1 = 0 in their terminology.
21Similarly to the approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we have also estimated the coeﬃ-
cient that captures the inﬂuence of output on ﬁscal pressure. This is equivalent to let the elasticity
of revenues to output being freely estimated. For all countries (except for the US) all the coeﬃ-
cients were highly non-signiﬁcant. Moreover, the inclusion of that additional coeﬃcient makes the
system exactly identiﬁed, thus unabling to check for diﬀerent regimes.
22For simplicity, we omit the time t subscript as all the relationships are contemporaneous.
ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 17gw = σwνw+ γ1νr+ γ2ντ
gr = γ3νw+ σrνr+ γ4ντ
τ = φ1νw+ φ2νr+ στντ
(4)
where νw, νr and ντ are the structural (i.e., mutually uncorrelated and economically
meaningful) shocks of the two expenditure aggregates and revenues.
The overall system is underidentiﬁed since the number of parameters to be es-
timated (24) is higher than the number of degrees of freedom that the available
covariances of the ﬁrst stage allow (21). Therefore, three additional constraints are
required in order to estimate the model exactly. Here we impose four restrictions,
so that we are able to calculate an overidentiﬁcation test. We propose four sets of
restrictions which identify four diﬀerent ﬁscal policy regimes.
1. T Regime: φ1 = φ2 = γ1 = γ3 = 0. This regime is characterized by the
(weak) exogeneity of the tax decisions, which aﬀect expenditure decisions without
being inﬂuenced in return. Moreover, the two expenditure aggregates are contempo-
raneously uncorrelated with each other. Were this regime not rejected by the data,
the structural innovations of revenues would represent the ﬁscal policy shock.
2. G Regime: γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = γ4 = 0. In this case expenditure decisions
are taken without any contemporaneous feedback from the revenue side, whereas
tax decisions take into account the expenditure shocks. Both expenditure decisions
are taken separately and there is no interaction between the two; they can be both
considered as ﬁscal policy shocks.
3. GW Regime: φ2 = γ1 = γ2 = γ4 = 0. This is a slight but signiﬁcant vari-
ation of the previous expenditure regime, in which government wages and transfers
play a central role. Changes in revenues and other expenditure components occur in
order to accommodate exogenous decisions on wages and transfers. The ﬁscal policy
shocks consist of structural innovations on expenditure on wages and transfers.
4. GR Regime: φ1 = γ2 = γ3 = γ4 = 0. This regime is similar to the
GW regime, but it takes residual spending as the most exogenous component of
ﬁscal policy. The ﬁscal policy shocks are innovations to residual spending: both
the spending on wages and transfers and revenues are adjusted according to these
shocks. It should be noticed that the inﬂuence of changes in the interest rate on
this item is already taken into account, since innovations in the interest rate enter
the gr equation via the coeﬃcient which takes the place (2,2) in the matrix A2,1.
Therefore, shocks to this equation are innovations that do not depend on changes
in interest rates.
The ﬁrst two regimes are not completely new in the literature. They were ﬁrstly
proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), although in a less extensive model. The
GW Regime, is instead proposed here for the ﬁrst time and is justiﬁed by the will-
ingness to check whether savings in government expenditure on wages and transfers
have a diﬀerent macroeconomic impact than other spending. The GR regime is
added for completeness. In all four cases, the overall system is overidentiﬁed by one
parameter. The overidentiﬁcation test allows to compare the appropriateness of the
model designed with an exactly identiﬁed model.
In the following section for each country we test which of the proposed ﬁscal
regimes is accepted by the data, and present a simulation analysis on the responses
ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 18Table 1: Probability Values of LR Tests for the Identiﬁcation of the Fiscal Regimes
(boldface=signiﬁcant at 5%)
Countries Regime T Regime G Regime GR Regime GW
France 6.70 ∗ 10−15 9.03 ∗ 10−15 0.409 0.334
West Germany 2.43 ∗ 10−13 8.52 ∗ 10−14 0.072 0.995
Italy 0.006 0.006 0.262 0.852
USA 0.032 0.069 0.091 0.005
of output to the identiﬁed ﬁscal shocks.
6 Empirical Findings
The model has been estimated for the three largest European countries (West Ger-
many, France and Italy) and for the US, which is used as a benchmark as most of the
existing empirical applications refer to it. We used quarterly data from the OECD
database for the period 1960-1997, with the only exception of West Germany, for
which we considered the subsample 1961-1989. Concerning the non ﬁscal policy
variables, we used the GDP deﬂator as an indicator of the price level and the money
market rate for the short-term interest rate, with the exception of Italy, for which we
used a medium-term government bond yield. Since policy decisions usually concern
nominal variables, the ﬁscal policy variables were considered in nominal terms.23
The real GDP is the variable used to test the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks on the economy.
All the variables, but nominal interest rates, are log-transformed.
The dynamic structure of the model have been selected according to the usual
optimality criteria on the number of lags.24 The estimation method used is the Fully
Information Maximum Likelihood and the standard errors of the impulse response
functions were computed via the Delta method.25 As explained in section 5.2, the
default model considers a contemporaneous one-to-one reaction of taxes to changes
in GDP. The distinction between the one-to-one and the zero reaction of revenues to
output is dealt with when we consider the impulse response functions to tax shocks.
Table 1 shows the results of the overidentiﬁcation test (likelihood ratio, LR,
test) for the four regimes we want to test. The table indicates a clear prevalence
of ﬁscal regimes where the spending decisions come ﬁrst rather than those where
tax decisions precede. At the 5% conﬁdence level, the GR regime is not rejected for
all countries. Moreover, the GW regime is still not rejected for all the European
countries, whereas the G regime cannot be rejected for the US. The US is the only
country for which the overidentiﬁcation test does not clearly discriminate between
the expenditure and the taxation regimes. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) cannot test
23We have also implemented the analysis using nominal government expenditure deﬂated with
the GDP deﬂator, as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). No major diﬀerences have been found in
the impulse response functions and all the overidentifying tests provided the same ﬁscal regimes
for all the countries.
24The Akaike, Hannan-Quinn and Schwarz tests suggested to use three lags for Italy and the US
and four for France and West Germany.
25See Hamilton (1994) and Amisano and Giannini (1997).
ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 19for ﬁscal policy regimes in the US since their system is exactly identiﬁed; however,
they stress that since tax and expenditure innovations are scarcely correlated, the
order of causality between the two variables is not relevant for the analysis of the
impulse response functions. The result of our test for US are in line with those of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
How stable are the accepted ﬁscal regimes over time? In order to check for the
possible change of ﬁscal regimes in our sample, we have computed recursively the
overidentifying tests for all the samples starting in 1960:1 and ending at consecutive
dates from 1980:1. The probability values of the most relevant regimes for each
country are reported in Fig. 3–6. The results for France and Italy show the accep-
tance of the GW and the GR regimes over all the subsamples. In West Germany
the regime GW is accepted with an higher probability than the GR regime over all
the sample period. For the US the GR regime is valid only starting from the end
of the 1980s, whereas the G regime is valid from the beginning of the 1990s. We
report the estimation and simulation details only for the not-rejected regimes.
The estimates of the coeﬃcients involved in the system (4), together with that of
the interest rate in the residual expenditure equation, are reported in Table 2. We
deﬁne “virtuous” the ﬁscal authority who decide to ﬁnance an increase of expendi-
ture either by a decrease in some other type of expenditure or/and by an increase
in revenues. In our framework we are able to evaluate whether the ﬁscal authorities
were “virtuous” by looking at the signs of estimated coeﬃcients.
In all European countries the two expenditure aggregates are positively corre-
lated: both γ1 and γ3 are signiﬁcantly positive, i.e. an increase in government wages
and transfers occurs together with an increase in the residual spending. At the same
time, no contemporaneous response is present in the tax revenue, since φ1 and φ2
are not statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, it seems that in West Germany, France and
Italy ﬁscal authorities did not adopted a virtuous behaviour as decisions on the ex-
penditure were not linked with those on taxes and were not compensated by other
spending restraints.
A diﬀerent conclusion holds for the US: a positive shock to government expen-
diture (especially the residual part) induces an increase in revenues, as φ2 is signiﬁ-
cantly positive. No signiﬁcant link exists between the two expenditure decisions in
the GR regime.
Amongst the other parameters of the matrix A in (2), it is interesting to consider
the coeﬃcient which describes the eﬀect of a change in interest rates on the residual
spending equation. Table 2 shows that the reaction of the residual government
expenditure to nominal interest rate innovations (parameter ηgr,r) has only a positive
sign for Italy (although not signiﬁcant), thus showing that an increase in the interest
rate induces an increase in the residual spending. For all the other countries, the
sign is negative (even signiﬁcantly in the US). As the residual spending contains
all the other government expenditures (including investment spending), the positive
eﬀect on interest payments might be overcome by the eﬀects on other spending.
6.1 Responses to Government Spending Shocks
In describing the estimated impulse-response functions (IRFs), we show both the
eﬀects of the innovation which characterises the regime (i.e. the innovation on










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 25government expenditure on wages and transfers in the GW regime) on the other
ﬁscal variables and output (part (a) of each ﬁgure) and the eﬀect of the innovation
of the “other” (with respect to the ﬁscal regime considered) expenditure item on the
own expenditure and output (part (b) of each ﬁgure). All the simulations presented
in this section refer to an initial negative shock on public expenditure; the bands
around the IRFs refer to a 95 per cent conﬁdence interval. In order to compare
the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks among countries, ﬁscal shocks have been
normalised by computing the responses to a 1 per cent decrease in the expenditure-
to-GDP ratio.26
Fig. 7–8 refer to France and show the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy innovations on
the expenditure side to the other ﬁscal variables and output.27 In the GW regime,
shocks to government spending on wages and transfers have the strongest and most
signiﬁcant eﬀect on output: after an initial positive reaction, output decreases by
more than 0.05 per cent quarterly as a response to a 1 per cent decrease in the
government wages and transfers-to-GDP ratio.28 In the GR regime the response of
output to both kind of expenditure shocks is scarcely signiﬁcant. However, under the
GR regime the decrease in output occurs together with a decrease in the price level
below trend (not reported in our ﬁgures): this co-movement of prices and output
(which is found also for other countries) may signal that the system is moving along
the AS curve and that we are correctly identifying AD shocks.
For West Germany, the eﬀect of a shock in government spending on wages and
transfers on output is not signiﬁcant in any of the two regimes GW and GR (Fig. 9
and 10), while the negative eﬀect of a shock that decreases the residual spending as
a share of GDP is signiﬁcant only for few quarters. Moreover, in the latter case the
maximum impact on output of a 1 per cent decrease in the government expenditure
ratio never goes beyond the 0.04 per cent quarterly. The exercise for West Germany
seems to signal that government expenditure does not play a very important role
for the dynamic of output in this country.
In Italy government wages and transfers expenditure has the strongest eﬀect on
output under both the accepted regimes (GW and GR). Both Fig. 11 and 12 show
a similar reaction of output, which permanently decreases by 0.1 per cent. On the
contrary, an initial negative shock on residual spending lowers output signiﬁcantly
only in the ﬁrst two quarters under both ﬁscal regimes.
Finally, in the US we ﬁnd a similar pattern as in Italy (Fig. 13–14): both in
the G and in the GR regimes, an initial negative shock on GW has a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect on output starting from the fourth quarter. the maximum decrease
of output is around 0.1 per cent after 13 quarters. A shock to the residual spending
item produces only an initial (signiﬁcant) negative impact on output.
These impulse response functions are characterised by a weak eﬀect of govern-
ment spending on GDP. This is also conﬁrmed by Perotti (2002) who, in addition,
ﬁnds signiﬁcant responses to spending shocks only in Germany and the US.
26Blanchard and Perotti (2002) show the dollar-to-dollar reaction of output to government ex-
penditure and taxes. Here, we decided to consider a diﬀerent normalization for the shocks to
highlight the eﬀect on output growth and to consider the ratios to GDP of ﬁscal variables.
27The responses to all the other variables (i.e. price level and interest rate) are available upon
request.
28The response of output to shocks in other expenditure is scarcely signiﬁcant.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 346.2 Responses to Tax Shocks
As mentioned above, we designed two diﬀerent ways in which revenues can react
to output: they can contemporaneously react one-to-one to output changes or no
contemporaneous reaction can be assumed. The simulation exercises described so
far considered the ﬁrst case. When analysing the eﬀects of tax shocks on output,
we refer to both cases in order to obtain the two case limits.
Fig. 15 – 18 show the eﬀects of a tax shock that reduces the revenue ratio by 1
per cent point. The two panels of each ﬁgure show the two extreme cases: i.e. when
tax revenues fully react contemporaneously or do not react immediately at all.29
In all countries the stimulating eﬀects on GDP are stronger when revenues react
one-to-one to output than in the opposite case. In the ﬁrst case, in all countries but
France we observe an increase in output, even though with diﬀerent characteristics.
In West Germany and Italy, the increase in output is immediate, although it remains
signiﬁcant only for few quarters. The maximum magnitude of the increase is 0.04
per cent in West Germany and 0.07 per cent in Italy on a quarterly base. In France
the output never reacts signiﬁcantly to a revenue shock. In the US, the decrease in
taxes has a surprisingly negative eﬀect on output on impact that turns out to be
positive, although not signiﬁcant, after one quarter. This latter result may suggest
that a further reduction in revenues in a country where ﬁscal pressure is already
relatively low, like the US, may not induce a positive eﬀect on output. When we
assume a null contemporaneous reaction of revenues to output, in two cases (France
and US) we notice a negative eﬀect of a decrease in taxation to GDP, while in the
other two cases the responses are not statistically signiﬁcant.
6.3 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
In order to measure the quantitative relevance of the ﬁscal shocks in the dynamics of
output, in this section we brieﬂy analyse the forecast error variance decomposition
of output. The Italian case is the only one where the contributions of ﬁscal shocks in
the explanation of variability of output are statistically signiﬁcant at the 95 per cent
conﬁdence level. Fig. 19 shows that in Italy the shocks to government wages and
transfers and to ﬁscal pressure are the most important in explaining the variability
of output. In particular, shocks to public wages and transfers are more relevant in
the medium-long run, whereas shocks to ﬁscal pressure are relevant in the short run.
The structural shock to government wages and transfers, νw, is signiﬁcant starting
from the ninth step ahead and is able to explain up to 26 per cent of the forecast
error variance of output (at 21 step ahead). Shocks to ﬁscal pressure (ντ) are instead
signiﬁcant up to the fourth step ahead explaining between 18 per cent (ﬁrst step)
and 10 per cent (fourth step) of the output variability.
A similar picture has been found for France, where the role of ﬁscal pressure,
although very small compared to the case of Italy, is the most relevant in the short
run, and shocks to public wages and transfers explain more than 10% of the forecasts
error variance decomposition of output in the medium/long term.
In West Germany and US, the shocks to the residual spending are the most
29The ﬁgures show the impact on output of a shock in taxation in only one of the accepted
regimes for each country. The responses for the omitted regimes are very similar.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 39important in the short run, explaining around 5-7% of output variability. In the long
period, in both cases, shocks to public wages and transfers and to taxation explain
from 10% (in West Germany) to more than 20% (in US) of output variability.
7 Conclusions
Diﬀerent ways of conducting ﬁscal policy are here deﬁned as ﬁscal policy regimes.
In this paper we proposed an approach to test for these regimes. By distinguish-
ing between diﬀerent budgetary categories, we wanted to test whether some ﬁscal
decisions preceded others. In order to do so, we designed the structural VAR in a
way to obtain an overidentiﬁed structural form so that each ﬁscal regime could be
tested.
In West Germany, France and Italy, the so-called GW regime, where government
expenditure on wages and transfers is decided before the other ﬁscal variables, was
not rejected by data. However, the GR regime, that targets the residual spending
was also accepted, thus indicating that both ﬁscal shocks are relevant and gener-
ally precede tax decisions. A clear-cut distinction between spending and taxation
decisions was not possible, instead, for the US.
Consistently with the ﬁndings of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti
(2002), all kinds of ﬁscal shocks (both on expenditure and on taxation) identiﬁed
within the selected ﬁscal regimes produce keynesian results on output. In contrast
with Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997), we ﬁnd that structural innovations in govern-
ment spending for wages and transfers have the strongest positive eﬀect on output
in Italy, the US and France (although the GW regime is rejected in the US).
In all the simulations the maximum impact of the ﬁscal policy shocks is limited:
a 1 per cent change in government spending on GDP or taxes/GDP rarely has an
impact on output larger than 0.1 per cent in a quarter. In no country does the
shock to tax revenues have a long-run impact. The ﬁnding of low multipliers is in
line with Perotti’s (2002) analysis.
In terms of output dynamics, the results are country-speciﬁc. In Italy, the only
country where the results are statistically signiﬁcant, shocks to government expen-
diture on wages and transfers are able to explain more than one-fourth of the total
variance in the forecast error of output in the long run. An important role is also
assigned to shocks to revenues (between 10 and 18 per cent), especially in the short
run. A similar picture is found for France, while in West Germany and US shocks
to the residual spending are the most relevant in explaining the variability of output
in the short run.
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The data come from the OECD Statistical Compendium and the IMF database.
Data on ﬁscal variables refer to the general government. Some of the available data
are at quarterly frequency but, as some other budget items are released only at
biannual frequency, quarterly series for them have been derived by distributing the
biannual values among the quarters following the pattern of a related and available
quarterly series. In what follows, sources, codes and deﬁnitions of the variables are
presented.
OECD Business Sectoral Database:
CGW = Government Consumption, Wages
GDP = Gross Domestic Product (Market Prices), Value
GDPV = Gross Domestic Product (Market Prices), Volume
IG = Fixed Investment, Government
PGDP = Deﬂator for GDP at Market Prices, Base year=100
TIND = Indirect Taxes
TSUB = Subsidies
TYB = Direct Taxes, Business
OECD Economic Outlook:
CGNW = Government Consumption, Excluding Wages
SSPG = Social Beneﬁts Paid by Government
SSRG = Social Security Contributions Received by Government
TRPG = Other Current Transfers Paid by Government
TRRG = Other Current Transfers Received by Government
TY = Total Direct Taxes
YPEPG = Property Income Paid by Government
YPERG = Property Income Received by Government
YPG = Current Disbursement, Government
YRG = Current Receipts, Government
OECD Main Economic Indicators:
126207D = Call Money Rate, Germany
426227D = US Dollar in London 3-Month, US
IMF International Financial Statistics:
line 61b = Government Bond Yield, Medium-Term, Italy
line 60b = Money Market Rate, France
Deﬁnitions of the variables used in the application:
- Price: PGDP
- Interest rates: 126207D, 426227D, 61b, 60b
- Government spending on wages and transfers: GW=CGW+(TSUB+SSPG+TRPG)
ECB • Working Paper No 281 • October 2003 42(Transfers (TSUB+SSPG+TRPG) smoothed using total expenditure)
Total expenditure: YPG+IG = CGW+CGNW+TSUB+SSPG+TRPG+YPEPG+IG
(Smoothed using CGW and TSUB)
- Residual spending: GR=YPG+IG-GW
- Current revenues: YRG = YPERG+TIND+TY+SSRG+TRRG
(Smoothed using TIND and TYB)
- Real GDP: GDPV
Countries and samples used for the estimation
West 1961:1 - 1989:4
France 1963:1 - 1997:4
Italy 1960:1 - 1997:4
US 1961:1 - 1997:4
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